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Abstract 
A general equilibrium elaboration of the classic model of inter-regional migration is used to 
examine the effects of a local tax-transfer scheme on migration. It is shown that a fair tax-transfer 
scheme, which does not distort the real wage comparisons of the migrants, does not affect 
migration. On the other hand, an unfair system is shown to encourage migration the more the 
smaller are the repayments as compared to the tax payments. In the longer term, when people adapt 
their perceptions concerning the repayments, the effects are dampened and eventually reduced to 
zero, provided that the scheme is actually fair.     
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1. Introduction 
 
In the literature of regional and urban economics, the classic theory on inter-regional migration is 
based on the analysis of the interplay of local labour markets. In the model, perfectly free and 
costless migration is motivated by inter-regional differences in real wages. Migration equalises the 
differences between localities and ends up to a market equilibrium, where nobody can benefit from 
relocation. In the equilibrium, the spatial allocation of labour is efficient.  
 
The literature of tax competition stresses that any local policy measures, which affect the welfare 
comparisons between localities must have influence on migration. This, in turn, yields constraints to 
policy variations. Particularly, labour income taxation in one locality should induce workers to 
migrate out from that locality, which makes the policy unsustainable in the longer run. However, in 
the spirit of the classic real wage model, a reasonable argument is that if taxes are fully 
compensated so that the real wage remains unaffected, there should be no effects on migration.  
 
This paper investigates the effects of local policy on migration in a general equilibrium elaboration 
of the classic labour market model. A simple scheme of wage taxes and consumption price 
subsidies is introduced, and its effects on local labour market conditions, migration and the 
sustainability of the policy are studied. In deriving the main results, an application of the neo-
Keynesian Adaptive Expectations Hypothesis is utilised concerning the fairness of the scheme.  The 
results match to the above basic intuition, but also shed some further light into the issue especially 
from a long-term viewpoint. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents the basic model to illustrate the local labour 
market circumstances under autarky and free migration in an economically determined market area, 
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which is henceforth called a locality. Chapter 3 constructs the tax-transfer scheme, and studies the 
effects of fair and sub-fair schemes on the local market equilibrium. The short-term and long-term 
emigration effects of the scheme are examined in chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes the findings. 
 
2. The model 
 
The model is an elaboration of a basic neoclassical macroeconomic model (for more conventional 
presentations see e.g. Brown & Jackson, 1978, p. 286-294; Heijdra and van der Ploeg, 2002, p. 8-
12). In the model, production is given by the production function  
 
(1) q = f(L,K), 
 
where the capital stock, K, is constant in the short term. Therefore, production depends on the 
amount of labour, L, measured in terms of labour time units. The standard neoclassical assumptions 
concerning the production function are made, namely constant returns to scale and f1 > 0, f11, f22 < 0, 
f12  = f21 > 0, where the subscripts refer to first and second derivatives of the function with respect to 
its arguments in order of appearance in function (1). 
 
Define the short-run profits in the firm sector of the economy as π = pq – wL, where p is the market 
price and w is the market reward for labour time. Recalling (1), competitive profit maximisation 
with respect to labour use yields 
 
(2) w = pf1 
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for the demand for labour in the economy, written in terms of nominal wages. By function (2) the 
demand for labour input equals the value of the marginal product of the input and, following from 
the assumption of diminishing marginal product of labour, the demand curve is unambiguously 
downwards sloping. The nominal price level and the marginal product of labour together determine 
labour demand in the economy.  
 
The household sector maximises utility U(q,1-L) subject to the budget constraint wL = pq. Under 
the assumption of perfect foresight, the supply of the labour input derived from the optimal time use 
decisions of the households then reads 
 
(3) w = pg(L), 
 
where g(L) describes the valuation of time respective to its opportunity cost. It is henceforth 
assumed that the marginal cost of labour time is, on the aggregate, positive, g’ > 0, which is to say 
that the substitution effects dominate the income effects in supplying labour time. The labour 
supply function (3) is therefore upwards sloping by assumption.   
 
Given that the capital stock is constant, the production function together with the labour market 
conditions determine the equilibrium output, that is the aggregate supply of the economy, through 
the price adjustment mechanism in goods and labour markets. In the long term, aggregate supply is 
invariant to the price level in the economy. That is, the aggregate supply curve of the economy is 
vertical in p-q space. Exogenous changes in the capital stock shifts the vertical aggregate supply 
curve horizontally.  
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For a simple introduction of migration to the model, assume that the local capital stock is fixed and 
immobile and that there is no trade between localities, but allow for labour migration in response to 
inter-locality differences in real wages. Assume that people are perfectly capable to monitor the real 
wage differentials, and that migration is costless. Assume also that the considered locality is of 
atomistic size in the economy so that migration does not change the circumstances in the 
competitive economy-wide labour market.  
 
Given that capital is immobile, there may exist inter-locality differences in initial factor 
endowments. This provokes differences in local productivity of labour and in real wages. Supposing 
that the real wage is lower in the considered locality than in the outer economy, the possibility of 
free migration implies not only emigration from the low wage locality but also adjustment of the 
local markets to the market conditions in the rest of the economy.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the market equilibrium of the basic model. The figure consists of four quadrants, 
the labour market in the northeast quadrant, the production function in the southeast quadrant, the 
aggregate goods market in the southwest quadrant and the real wage in the northwest quadrant.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
In Figure 1, at the autarky labour market equilibrium e0, nominal wages and prices are w0 and p0, 
respectively, which give w0/p0 = ω0 for the equilibrium real wage. Labour use is L0 and production 
is q0. Since the aggregate supply schedule is invariant to the price level around the equilibrium 
point, it can be presented by the vertical graph AS0 in the southwest quadrant of the figure. The 
relevant goods market equilibrium is presented by point ε0 on the AS0 curve.  
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The simultaneous e0-ε0 equilibrium is sustainable given that the goods market is in equilibrium. 
That is, the aggregate supply that results from the above analysis must equal aggregate demand at 
the equilibrium point. The derivation of the aggregate demand curve from the relevant IS-LM 
setting of the economy is ignored for simplicity, and the goods market equilibrium is henceforth 
simply assumed to hold.  
 
In Figure 1 the market real wage of the outer economy is presented by the slope ω*, which is 
assumed to be steeper than that of the local real wage line ωe. Under perfect mobility this fact must 
be taken as given in the local labour market, where labour demand and labour supply must adjust 
accordingly.  
 
To examine the market adjustment take the simplest experiment and set the local price level fixed to 
p0. Facing the market real wage line ω* and reading at p0, the adjustment must be carried out fully 
by the rise of the local nominal wage to w1. At this nominal wage, local employment falls to L1 and 
production falls consequently to q1. The aggregate supply curve shifts inwards from AS0 to AS1, 
along which the new goods market equilibrium occurs at ε1. The induced emigration amounts to L’-
L1, measured in terms of labour time units.   
 
The adjustment could be tracked out also by taking the nominal wage w0 as fixed. From this point of 
view, adoption to ω* necessitates a fall in prices, which induces labour demand to decrease, and 
labour supply to increase. The result is essentially the same as above: local employment and 
production are L1 and q1, respectively, the aggregate supply curve shifts to AS1, and the amount of 
emigration is L’-L1. Adjustment in both prices and nominal wages could be allowed as well. As 
both adjust simultaneously as response to emigration from the locality, nominal wages rise because 
of the fall in labour supply, and prices fall because of the decrease of demand for local goods and 
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services. Under perfect foresight, the result is again the same as above: emigration is L’-L1. (For 
details, see Laurila, 2004.) 
 
To conclude, the fact that there exist real wage differences in the economy motors up migration and 
induces adjustment in the local labour and goods markets. In the setting of Figure 1 the initial 
welfare gap is unfavourable to the considered locality, and the market adjustment results in 
emigration and a fall of production, but also in higher real wages for those who stay put in the 
locality. The effects are reversed in a locality that confronts lower real wages in the outer economy.  
  
3. The tax-transfer scheme  
 
To introduce public policy in the considered locality, let the locality implement a tax-transfer 
scheme, which imposes a tax on labour income, and uses the tax revenue to support a transfer 
program. The tax rate is t, 0<t<1, issued on nominal wages. The respective transfers are given in 
the form of a price subsidy of rate s, 0<s<1. The net nominal wage for the workers then is (1-t)w, 
and the net consumption price level is (1-s)p.  
 
The tax-transfer program changes the situation in the local labour market somewhat. Since the 
program does not concern the firms the labour demand function (2) remains unaltered. The labour 
supply function (3) is, however, affected by the scheme and reads now 
 
(3’) w = αpg(L), 
 
where α = (1-s)/(1-t) > 0 is the inverse of the implicit rate of return of the scheme. Under a fair 
system, where the taxes are fully repaid to the taxpayers, t = s and α = 1, which is to say that the 
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workers’ real wage, ω  = (1-t)w/(1-s)p remains unaffected. The implicit rate of return of the system 
is one-to-one.  
 
If t > s, that is α > 1, the implicit rate of return of the tax-transfer scheme falls below one-to-one. 
This is to say that the scheme is unfair or, in particular, sub-fair. This may happen for several 
reasons. First, the scheme may be intentionally sub-fair because of other policy goals. Second, the 
scheme may end sub-fair because of administrative transaction costs, or due to inefficiencies in the 
public sector. And third, people may be myopic and have adaptive-like expectations concerning the 
working of the system (about AEH, see Heijdra & van der Ploeg, 2002, p. 31-35).  
 
If s  > t, and α < 1, the implicit rate of return of the scheme becomes higher than one-to-one. This 
kind of a scheme can be labelled super-fair. In the present static model a super-fair program might 
be reasoned by referring to over-optimistic expectations concerning the working of the system. 
However, this kind of an interpretation is not very appealing in practice, and even the original AEH 
presentations seldom refer to these kinds of adaptation paths.  
 
To study the comparative static properties of the model, use functions (2) and (3’), totally 
differentiate and manipulate. Evaluate at α = 1, dK = 0 and have  
 
(4) ,0'
)(
11
<= −∂∂ gf LgLα  
 
which says that a fall in the implicit rate of return of the scheme (a rise in α) makes the labour 
market equilibrium shift backwards along the labour supply curve. The respective effect on 
production reads, after totally differentiating function (1), solving for dL and substituting in 
functions (2) and (3’) 
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(5) .0'
)(
1 11
<= −∂∂ gf Lgq fα  
 
The result simply states that the induced change in production is the fall in labour supply given by 
expression (4) times the marginal product of labour. That is, for a given capital stock, the smaller is 
the implicit rate of return of the program (the higher is α) the lower is the equilibrium output of the 
economy 
 
The change in the real wage faced by the employers can be derived by totally differentiating 
functions (2) and (3’), and substituting for dL from the latter to the former. After manipulation,  
 
(6) ,0'
)(
11 11
>= −gf Lgdd fαω  
 
saying that the employers face a rise in the real wages because of the fall in labour supply given by 
expression (4). The respective real wage faced on the supply side can be derived by defining the 
workers’ real wage as ϖ  = ω/α and substituting the definition into (2) and (3’). The effect reads 
 
(7) ,0'
'
1 11
<= −∂∂ gf gfαϖ  
 
which states the fact that the workers’ real wage is reduced if the repayment rate from the scheme 
falls below one-to-one.  
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Figure 2 illustrates the comparative static properties of the model outlined by the above expressions 
(4)–(7). The figure considers only effects of fair and sub-fair programs. A super-fair program is not 
presented because of its minor practical relevance.  
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
In Figure 2, the initial autarky equilibrium of the local labour market occurs at the intersection point 
e0 of the labour demand and labour supply schedules D0 and S0. The equilibrium real wage being 
ω0, employment is L0, production is q0, and the corresponding goods market equilibrium is at point 
ε0 along the AS0 curve in the southwest quadrant of the figure. 
 
The implementation of the wage tax t imposes a tax wedge tw in the labour market, and results in a 
split of the labour demand curve into two curves D0 and D0’. The former is the gross wage curve 
encountered by the firms. Since the tax-transfer scheme does not affect the firms, the demand side 
remains to be determined by the initial marginal physical product of the labour input described by 
D0. The latter curve is the net wage curve encountered by the workers. The D0’ curve is flatter than 
the D0 curve because the constancy of the tax rate t implies that the tax wedge tw is a constant 
proportion of the available gross wage, given by D0. Therefore, the tax wedge gets narrower in 
absolute terms as L increases. 
 
The new autarky equilibrium now depends on the reaction of labour supply. Under a fair tax-
transfer scheme, α = 1, the taxes are fully compensated in the form of price subsidies. Therefore, 
the real wage of the workers remains unaltered at ω0. As a response to the inwards shift of the 
perceived labour demand curve D0’, the labour supply curve shifts outwards to S0’ so that the new 
autarky equilibrium occurs at e0’ horizontally below e0. Employment and production remain at L0 
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and q0, respectively. From the workers’ point of view, the goods market equilibrium is described by 
point ε0’ on the vertical AS0 curve, corresponding to point E0’ along ω0 in the northwest quadrant of 
Figure 2. The net nominal wage is w0’ = (1– t)w0 and the subsidised price level is p0’ = (1—s) p0. 
The tax wedge is tw0 in terms if nominal wages and sp0 in terms of prices. The tax wedge separates 
the labour supply equilibrium e0’ from the labour demand equilibrium e0. However, the wedge does 
not create any dead weight loss because the separation occurs vertically around the efficient labour 
market equilibrium. The goods market equilibrium is at point ε0 on the vertical AS0 curve. 
 
The labour supply response is different if the system is sub-fair, α > 1. The benefit side of the 
scheme falls below or is undervalued as compared to the tax payments. Furthermore, expressions 
(6) and (7) suggest that, in this case, the real wage perceived by the workers deviates from that 
faced by the firms. In particular, ϖ < ω.  
 
In the extreme version of a sub-fair system the tax payments remain totally uncompensated, that is 
for any t > 0, s = 0 and α = 1/(1-t). In Figure 2 this version is described by the shift of the workers’ 
real wage from ω0 to ϖ1 and by the shift of the firms’ real wage from ω0 to ω1, reasoned by 
expressions (6) and (7), respectively. Since the workers do not anticipate any decline in prices, the 
labour supply curve does not shift. The labour supply equilibrium thus shifts from e0 to e1’, and the 
corresponding labour demand equilibrium shifts from e0 to e1 in the northeast quadrant of the figure. 
According to expressions (4) and (5), employment falls to L1, and production decreases to q1. The 
workers’ goods market equilibrium shifts to ε1, which implies that the AS1 curve is not properly 
determined – the firms’ and the workers’ decisions deviate horizontally in this case. The tax wedge 
is now tw1 > tw0. The market distortion causes a welfare loss that can be measured by the area 
e1’e1e0, or inversely by the area e1’ e0 e0” (compare to Hansen & Nielsen, 1997, p. 68). 
 
  12 
The case of partially perceived repayments, t > s > 0, 1 < α < 1/(1-t) is presented by the real wage 
pair ϖ2 for workers and ω2 for firms in the northwest quadrant of Figure 2. Perceiving net prices p2, 
and anticipating a fall in real wages induces the workers to work less than under a fair system, but 
more than without any repayments. Their labour supply curve settles to S1, the workers’ equilibrium 
is described by points e2’ and E2’, and the firms’ equilibrium is described by e2 and E2. As a result, 
employment is L2, and production is q2. The respective workers’ goods market equilibrium is at ε2, 
which means that the (short-term) aggregate supply curve AS2 is not properly determined – the 
firms’ and the workers’ decisions deviate along an upwards-sloping line in p-q space. The tax 
wedge is now tw2, tw1 > tw2> tw0. The induced welfare loss can be inversely measured by that part 
of the area e1’ e0 e0”, which remains rightwards from the L2e2 line in the northeast quadrant of the 
figure.  
 
However, provided that the tax-transfer scheme is actually fair, the above two solutions concerning 
the sub-fair case are short-term in nature. Because the budget of the tax-transfer scheme is, by 
definition, in balance in the fair case, a sub-fair system runs a budget surplus. In the extreme 
version, where the prices are totally unsubsidised, s = 0, the system runs a surplus of tw1, and in the 
case of partial repayments the surplus is tw2 – (p0-p2) > 0. Supposing that the tax revenue is not 
used to promote other policy goals or to cover transaction costs and inefficiencies, accumulation of 
the budget surplus gives the workers reason to change their perceptions concerning the system. By 
the AEH interpretation of the model, workers adapt towards a fair system. In the long term, labour 
supply and production increase towards L0 and q0, respectively. The aggregate supply curve 
eventually converges to the vertical AS0 schedule. 
 
4. Effects on migration 
 
  13 
To complete the analysis, allow for free migration in the economy, and examine the effects of the 
local tax-transfer scheme on emigration. Figure 3 represents the situation of an atomistic locality, in 
which the equilibrium real wage is lower than that in the rest of the economy. 
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
In Figure 3, all emigrants from the locality can find work elsewhere for the constant real wage ω*. 
To give a benchmark for migration responses, the pre-policy situation is presented by the autarky 
equilibrium point e0 in the labour market and by the corresponding point E0 in the northwest 
quadrant of the figure. Local employment is L0 and local production is q0. In the absence of local 
policy, the migration response to the real wage difference ω* - ω0 can be read at p0 as a vertical 
shift from E0 to F. Horizontally, this amounts to emigration measured by the length of the line 
segment ab in the northeast quadrant of the figure. Local employment falls from L0 to La, local 
production falls from q0  to qa and the vertical aggregate supply curve shifts from  AS0 to AS0. The 
free migration equilibrium is efficient. 
 
Now, consider the migration response under a tax-transfer scheme. Under a fair system, α = 1, the 
local real wage ω0 remains unchanged. The net wage for workers is given by D0’, and the respective 
the labour supply is given by S0’ in Figure 3. The workers’ equilibrium e0’ is vertically separated 
from the firms equilibrium e0 in the northeast quadrant, and the respective equilibrium point E0’ is 
separated from E0 along ω0 in the northwest quadrant of the figure.  
 
Taking the workers’ perspective and reading at p0’, free migration implies adjustment from ω0 to 
ω*, that is from E0’ to F’ in the northwest quadrant of Figure 3, which amounts to emigration 
measured by the line segment a’b’ in the northeast quadrant. The respective firms’ optimum is at 
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point a. Points a and a’ are vertically one upon the other, and both the workers and the firms face 
the same equilibrium real wage ω*. The tax wedge is the vertical distance between points a and a’, 
and the budget balance holds at the real wage ω*. Since a’b’ = ab, neither local employment and 
production nor migration are affected by the scheme. The conclusion is that a fair tax-transfer 
scheme does not distort the efficient free migration equilibrium. 
 
The result is somewhat different under a sub-fair system. The extreme case, where α = 1/(1-t), is 
represented in Figure 3 by the workers’ equilibrium e1’ in the labour market, and by the 
corresponding point E1’ on the real wage line ϖ1. Under these circumstances, reading at p0, 
adjustment to the market real wage ω* implies a shift from E1’ to F. The respective solution on the 
firms’ side (not drawn in the figure) is on D0 at the employment level Lc, which implies that their 
real wage line is steeper than ω*. Thus, the short-term equilibrium is distorted. The consequent 
amount of emigration is measured by the line segment cb in the northeast quadrant of the figure. 
Quite unambiguously, cb > ab, which says that a pure tax system accelerates emigration in the short 
run.  
 
The above finding that an increase in the local tax rate accelerates emigration corresponds to the 
basic intuition. Yet, since the scheme actually runs a surplus, AEH type adjustment towards the 
above long-term equilibrium is induced. Responding to the accumulation of the surplus, the 
workers’ gradually increase their work effort. The migration effect is eventually dampened, and the 
long-term effect converges to that of a fair system, namely zero.  
 
Under a sub-fair system of partial repayments, 1 < α < 1/(1-t), the workers’ equilibrium in the 
labour market is, say, e2 in the northeast quadrant, and the respective point along the real wage line 
ϖ2 is E2’ in the northwest quadrant of Figure 3. Reading at the relevant price level p2, the 
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adjustment leads from E2’ to F”, and the resulting emigration is measured by the line segment df in 
the northeast quadrant. The firms’ solution is again based on a real wage line steeper than ω* (not 
drawn in the northwest quadrant). It is quite evident that ab < df < cb, which says that this kind of a 
system accelerates emigration, but less than a pure tax system. The result is intuitive.  
 
The above solution is again both distorted and short-term in nature. The budget of the scheme runs a 
surplus, which again induces AEH type adjustment towards the efficient long-term solution. If the 
workers’ are actually fully compensated, they are also induced to gradually increase their work 
effort. The adjustment path leads to the long-term solution, where the migration effect is reduced to 
zero.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The paper provides a simple and illustrative model for the analysis of the effects of local policy on 
inter-locality migration. A local tax-transfer scheme of wage taxes and consumption price subsidies 
is introduced. The effects of the scheme are shown to depend on whether the scheme is fair or 
unfair, which again depends on if taxes are expected to be fully repaid in terms of subsidies or not. 
Even an actually fair scheme may be anticipated sub-fair in the short term, during the AEH type 
adaptation path towards the long-term equilibrium.  
 
The main lesson from the analysis is three-fold. First, a fair and correctly perceived tax-transfer 
scheme does not affect migration. This is because a fair system leaves the local real wage 
unchanged and thus has no effects on inter-locality welfare comparisons. The free migration 
equilibrium is efficient. The result holds in a perfect foresight type world, around a market solution 
that is long-term in nature.  
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Second, a sub-fair tax-transfer scheme has a short-term effect that encourages emigration. The 
effect is the stronger the farther away the short-term equilibrium is from the long-term one. A pure 
tax system with no (anticipated) repayments quite intuitively has the strongest effect. Even 
partial(ly anticipated) repayments from the system weaken the motives to emigrate. The short-term 
migration equilibrium is distorted because the real wage faced by the workers deviates from that 
faced by the firms. 
 
And third, under the sub-fair tax-transfer scheme, the short-term effects of the scheme are 
eventually dampened in the longer term, provided that the tax revenue is not wasted or used to other 
purposes, which do not benefit the worker-taxpayers. This is because continuing accumulation of 
the budget surplus of the scheme promotes AEH type adjustment in the supply of labour, and leads 
to convergence towards the efficient long-term equilibrium.   
 
The results of the paper concern the effects of a fair or sub-fair tax-transfer scheme on emigration, 
but they can, of course, be converted to cover immigration and super-fair programs. The main 
intuition is based in any case on the effects of the scheme on local labour supply: fair programs 
induce local workers to respond so that domestic labour supply remains unchanged, while sub-fair 
programs induce less than appropriate and super-fair programs induce more than appropriate 
increases in domestic labour supply. The changes in the local market conditions then have the 
obvious short-term effects on emigration and immigration, which dampen out in the longer term.  
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 Figure 1: The local market equilibrium 
 
 
 w
 
ω* 
ω
 e1 
S0 
w1 
 
pAS0 
p0 
AS1 
 e0 
w
ε1
ε0D0 
q
L’ 
q1 
q0 
L1 L0 
L
f(L,K) 
  19 
Figure 2: Effects of a tax-transfer scheme on the autarky equilibrium 
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Figure 3: Effects of a tax-transfer scheme on emigration 
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